That cause better be good

THE WEEK IN TORTS

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 51 NUMBER 35

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 4, 2026

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT AMENDS CIVIL RULES 1.080 AND 1.090 EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2026— “GOOD CAUSE” STILL REQUIRED FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME AND AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH

In Re: Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.080, 1.090, and 1.490, 51 Fla. L. Weekly S269 (Fla. September 3, 2026):

The Florida Supreme Court considered proposed amendments submitted by the Civil Procedure Rules Committee to Rules 1.080, 1.090, and 1.490. After receiving a comment opposing the proposed changes to Rule 1.490, the Committee withdrew those proposed amendments, and the Court declined to amend Rule 1.490.

The Court did amend Rule 1.080 to clarify that documents must be filed “with the court” and added new subdivisions expressly requiring filed documents to comply with the document and signature requirements contained in Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.520 and 2.515. The amendments also require PDFs of filed transcripts to be text searchable.

However, the Court declined to adopt a proposed substantive change to Rule 1.090 governing extensions of time. The proposal would have removed “good” from the existing “good cause” standard and would have permitted extensions without good cause where the parties agreed.

The Court rejected both changes. Thus, “good” cause remains the standard for an extension of time (meaning that an agreement by the parties alone, does not eliminate that requirement).

The amendments to Rules 1.080 and 1.090 become effective October 1, 2026, at 12:01 a.m.

TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS, WHERE THE PLAINTIFF WAITED YEARS AND FAILED TO PRODUCE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING A GENUINE FACTUAL DISPUTE

Salussolia v. Nunnari, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1764 (Fla. 3d DCA August 26, 2026):

The plaintiff filed a contract action arising from an agreement executed in 2011. During the litigation, the plaintiff failed to timely respond to requests for admissions, resulting in technical “admissions” concerning facts central to liability. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s attempt to withdraw the admissions and entered summary judgment for the defendant.

Although Florida law strongly favors deciding genuinely disputed cases on their merits rather than on technicalities, that principle did not require withdrawal here. The case had been pending since 2014, the requests for admissions were served in 2023, and the plaintiff did not seek relief from the admissions until 2025, after the defendant had moved for summary judgment. The appellate court rather charitably observed that the case “had not been diligently prosecuted.”

More importantly, the plaintiff failed to identify admissible record evidence contradicting the admissions. Its verified summary judgment response relied on counsel’s statement that the allegations were true to the best of his “knowledge and belief.” A statement based on information and belief rather than personal knowledge is not admissible evidence and does not create a genuine issue of material fact.

Unlike cases where technical admissions conflict with actual evidence already in the record, there was nothing here demonstrating a genuine factual dispute. The appellate court therefore affirmed the refusal to withdraw the admissions and the resulting summary judgment.

NEW TRIAL REQUIRED WHERE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED CRITICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY BASED ON “SURPRISE” THAT RESULTED FROM DEFENDANT’S OWN FAILURE TO CONDUCT TIMELY EXPERT DISCOVERY—TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN DENYING JUROR INTERVIEW AFTER JUROR REVEALED POST-VERDICT THAT SHE HAD CONCEALED HER PRIOR LANDLORD EXPERIENCE

Stout v. Cassity, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1774 (Fla. 2d DCA August 28, 2026):

The plaintiff rented an apartment from the defendant. After a heavy storm, the plaintiff reported water leaking from her kitchen ceiling. The defendant’s son inspected the leak and poked a hole in the ceiling with a broom handle. He left shortly thereafter without performing additional repairs or investigation. Minutes later, part of the ceiling collapsed onto the plaintiff’s head.

The plaintiff timely disclosed a construction expert who was expected to testify about the ceiling collapse, including causation. Months before trial, the plaintiff also produced a short document explaining that the structure actually contained two ceilings, with a gap between them where substantial water could accumulate. The expert estimated that the wet section that collapsed weighed at least 240 pounds. The defendant for whatever reason chose not to depose the expert before trial. It sent expert discovery which was objected to based on the defendant having exceeded the number of interrogatories.

Shortly before trial, the defendant filed an “emergency” motion to compel responses to that discovery, and then moved to exclude the expert’s opinions set forth in the document he created, as unreliable and as “surprise” testimony. The trial court not only limited the plaintiff’s expert’s opinions but allowed the defendant to depose the expert during trial. The jury found for the defendant landlord.

The appellate court reversed. It held that any surprise claimed by the defendant was self-inflicted. The defendant had ample opportunity to conduct proper expert discovery but failed to do so—and was even permitted to depose the expert during a break in the trial. Nothing required the expert’s short pretrial document to contain every opinion he might offer at trial (there was no “report” requirement in the court’s case pre-trial order). Because the excluded testimony concerned critical issues that no other identified witness could address, its exclusion was harmful and required a new trial.

Additionally, during voir dire, plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they had experience as landlords or in property management. Several prospective jurors disclosed such experience, two were struck for cause, and the plaintiff used a peremptory challenge on another. One juror who ultimately served, however, remained silent.

After the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, that juror disclosed that she had previously been a landlord but had chosen not to reveal it during voir dire because she believed she could nevertheless be fair.

The plaintiff moved for a juror interview supported by affidavits describing the post-verdict disclosure. The trial court denied the motion, which the appellate court found to be error. Because the plaintiff had showed grounds that the juror concealed relevant and material information despite counsel’s diligent and repeated questioning.

Because the erroneous exclusion of the expert testimony required a new trial before a new jury, the juror-interview issue ultimately became moot, but also necessitated one. The appellate court reversed the defense judgment and remanded for a new trial.