It’s a New York state of mind

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 50 NUMBER 44

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 7, 2025

HEARSAY “STATE OF MIND” EXCEPTION DOES NOT COVER BACKWARD-LOOKING RELIANCE STATEMENTS; HARMFUL ERROR TEST APPLIED STRICTLY IN ENGLE PROGENY TRIAL

Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Lipp, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D2365 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 29, 2025):

The personal representative of a smoker’s estate obtained a $43 million verdict against Philip Morris after a retrial, including $28 million in punitive damages. The decedent’s sons were allowed to testify over repeated hearsay objections, that after their mother’s lung was removed and after her cancer diagnosis, she was angry at the tobacco companies saying that “they lied to me,” that she believed filtered cigarettes would keep her safe, and that she wished she had never smoked. Plaintiff’s counsel emphasized those statements in closing to demonstrate that the decedent had personally relied on the companies’ misrepresentations about filtered cigarettes.

The Third District held those statements were inadmissible hearsay. It rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the testimony fit the “then existing state of mind” exception in section 90.803(3)(a), pointing out the statutory limitation in section 90.803(3)(b). That section states that after-the-fact statements of memory or belief are not admissible to prove the fact remembered or believed. Evidence comes in if the statement expresses a then-existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation and is offered to prove that present state or to explain subsequent conduct when state of mind is actually at issue. It is not admissible if it recounts past events or prior reliance to prove those earlier facts.

The court explained that the sons’ testimony was not about why their mother was currently smoking, but about why she smoked in the past and how she later felt once the truth about filtered cigarettes was revealed. Those were classic backward-looking memory statements offered to prove past reliance and causation and thus fell squarely within the statutory exclusion in section 90.803(3)(b).

Applying the Special v. West Boca Medical Center test for harmless error, the court reiterated that the beneficiary of an error has the burden to prove there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. The focus is on the effect of the error on the factfinder, not just whether there was ample other evidence to support the result. The Third District emphasized that even cumulative-seeming evidence can be harmful if it has unique evidentiary or emotional impact.

Here, the improperly admitted statements went directly to the key disputed element of fraudulent concealment and conspiracy and were repeatedly delivered in highly emotional contexts (post-surgery, “last trip” with a dying mother). Counsel framed them “powerfully” in closing argument, leading to the jury’s consideration of punitive damages, and rendering the error harmful.

COURT RULES THAT HOSPITAL SHOULD GET BROAD STATUTORY IMMUNITY FOR GOOD-FAITH CHILD-ABUSE REPORTING AND PARTICIPATION IN CHAPTER 39 PROCESS; TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY NARROWED SECTION 39.203(1)(a) AND ALLOWED JURY TO RELITIGATE IMMUNE CONDUCT

Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital, Inc. v. Kowalski, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D2325 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 29, 2025):

For anyone who may remember this case after seeing the Netflix series depicting it (Take Care of Maya), Maya Kowalski, her father, and the estate of her mother, Beata, won a huge verdict against Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital on claims including multiple counts of false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death based on IIED, medical negligence, battery, and fraudulent billing.

The case arose from Maya’s 2016 admission for severe pain from Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS). Her mother (who was a nurse) had been advocating the treatment of the CRPS with a high-dose ketamine regimen (other doctors supported that). Based on the mother’s actions and the high dose of medication, the hospital suspected medical child abuse, making multiple hotline calls to DCF. A court issued a dependency shelter petition, during which Maya was sheltered at the hospital under dependency-court orders that limited parental contact and controlled her care.

Before the trial, the court ruled that the hospital had reasonable cause to suspect abuse and was immune under section 39.203(1)(a) from claims based on its reports to the abuse hotline. But the court read the statute narrowly and declined to extend immunity to much of the conduct that occurred after DCF became involved and the dependency court issued orders.

It thus allowed the jury to hear extensive arguments and evidence attacking the hospital’s motives for reporting, and the psychological impact of the sheltering period. After a two-month trial, the jury found for the Kowalskis on all the remaining claims.

On appeal, the Second District held the trial court misconstrued and misapplied section 39.203(1)(a). The statutory test, the court explained, has two key features.

First, any person or institution who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse and reports it as chapter 39 requires, is immune as a matter of law. Once reasonable cause is shown, the reporter is, by definition, acting in good faith, and motive is irrelevant.

Second, separate from reporting, any person or institution “participating in good faith in any act authorized or required by” chapter 39 is also immune from civil or criminal liability. The statute is to be construed liberally in light of chapter 39’s stated purpose of protecting children and preventing abuse.

While the trial court correctly found that the hospital had reasonable cause to suspect abuse when it reported the Kowalskis to DCF, it mistakenly stopped there and failed to apply the second clause of the immunity statute to the hospital’s ongoing role once Maya was placed in DCF custody, and the dependency court issued shelter orders.

By designating the hospital as the placement facility and directing that the hospital’s medical staff be free to address Maya’s needs without interference, the dependency court effectively required the hospital to implement those orders: limiting contact, supervising visits and calls, managing what could be brought into the room, and coordinating with DCF and the Child Protection Team. Those actions were “acts authorized or required by” chapter 39 and by the dependency orders entered under that chapter.

The appellate court also noted there was nothing in the record to suggest the hospital acted in bad faith in making the reports or in carrying out the dependency court’s directives. Under the statute, good-faith participation is immunized, and these reporting and protective-services provisions are intended to protect even “overzealous” reporters so long as they act in good faith on reasonable suspicions; they are not meant to expose them to massive civil liability for complying with child-protection procedures.

The Second District concluded that by allowing the jury to revisit whether there really was abuse, to question the hospital’s motives for reporting, and to award damages tied to the sheltering and dependency-related restrictions that flowed from the court’s orders, the trial court effectively nullified the immunity section 39.203(1)(a) was meant to provide.

The court found these legal errors required reversal and remanded with instructions that the hospital’s statutory immunity for good-faith reporting and chapter 39 participation be given its full, liberal effect in determining which claims, if any, would be allowed to proceed to a re-trial.