Construction as rigid as steel

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 51 NUMBER 20

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF MAY 22, 2026

BROAD RIDESHARE IMMUNITY STATUTE ENACTED IN 2022 BARRED CLAIMS AGAINST LYFT FOR INJURY DURING A RIDE, EVEN WHERE PLAINTIFF PLED DIRECT MISREPRESENTATION THEORIES–APPELLATE COURT HELD THAT THE BROAD LANGUAGE OF SECTION 627.748(18) REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE NEGLIGENT AND FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS

Haddad v. Lyft Florida, Inc., 51 Fla. L. Weekly D986 (Fla. May 13, 2026):

The plaintiff alleged that she took a Lyft ride on April 15, 2022, and that during the ride, her Lyft driver assaulted her, causing severe and permanent personal injuries. She sued Lyft, not on a typical respondeat superior theory, but for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation. Her theory was that Lyft’s own website representations about safety caused her to trust the ride and use the service.

The complaint alleged Lyft advertised “High Safety Standards” and “Proactive Safety Measures.” It represented that its drivers had to pass background checks, undergo annual re-screening, be continuously monitored for criminal convictions, and complete a safety program. The plaintiff alleged she reviewed and relied on those representations before deciding to use Lyft.

Lyft moved to dismiss based on section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes, the transportation network company (TCN) statute.

The trial court dismissed, finding the complaint did not allege facts to bring the plaintiff’s claims within an exception to the statute’s default rule of nonliability. The appellate court affirmed based on its statutory construction analysis.

The court began by acknowledging the plaintiff’s basic point: she was not suing Lyft just because it was affiliated with the driver; she was alleging Lyft’s own safety misrepresentations caused her injuries.

The court found that distinction did not save the claim because of how broad the statutory text is, appearing to subsume any claim against a rideshare company for an injury suffered during a ride, so long as the TNC complied with the statute and did not engage in criminal conduct.

The plaintiff’s first statutory argument was that subsection 18 is titled “Vicarious liability,” so the immunity should be limited to traditional vicarious liability claims. The court rejected that, explaining that a statutory title cannot override the plain text. A title may help orient the reader, but it does not limit words that are broader than the heading.

The court then broke down the operative language. Under the statute, a TNC is not liable “under general law,” by reason of owning, operating, or maintaining the digital network accessed by a driver or rider, or by being the TNC affiliated with the driver, for harm that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged on to the network.

The court emphasized that “under general law” is broad. The phrase “by reason of” carries a but-for causation concept. It noted that “arises out of” is broader than proximate cause, meaning originating from, growing out of, flowing from, incident to, or having a connection with.

Applying that language, the court concluded the statute barred plaintiff’s claims.

They were claims under general law. They connected Lyft’s alleged wrongdoing–false safety representations–to the harm through Lyft’s owning, operating, or maintaining the TNC network. The injury arose out of the use, operation, or possession of a vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver was logged on.

The court said it did not matter that the complaint tried to plead direct negligence/misrepresentation by Lyft instead of traditional vicarious liability. The statute was broad enough to encompass the claims anyway.

The plaintiff’s second argument focused on the statutory exception for “negligence under this section.” Section 627.748(18)(a)1 provides that a TNC is not liable if there is no “negligence under this section” or criminal wrongdoing by the TNC. The plaintiff argued that “negligence under this section” should mean negligence related to Lyft’s operation of the digital TNC network. If that were right, then her claims based on Lyft’s safety representations might avoid the immunity.

The appellate court rejected that argument too. It construed “negligence under this section” to mean negligence in failing to comply with section 627.748 itself–that is, a negligent failure to meet the statute’s specific requirements for TNCs. The court reasoned that section 627.748 sets out a comprehensive regulatory framework for rideshare companies, and subsection 18 creates immunity so long as the company complies with those statutory obligations and does not engage in criminal wrongdoing.

The court also compared the statute to the federal Graves Amendment. The Graves Amendment contains an exception for “negligence or criminal wrongdoing” generally. Florida’s TNC statute, however, says “negligence under this section.” The court treated that added phrase as important, concluding that it narrows the exception to “negligence under section 627.748,” not ordinary negligence or general misrepresentation theories.

The plaintiff asserted that giving that phrase meaning would render subsection 18(a)2 superfluous (providing no liability if the company has fulfilled all its obligations under the section with respect to the driver).

The courts response to that was that sometimes “different canons will cut different ways,” and the fact that subsection 18 is drafted in such a way that “makes it impossible to cleanly apply every canon is a challenge that courts must confront, rather than an invitation to abdicate [its] interpretive role.”

The court explained that canons of construction do not operate like inflexible commands, and sometimes statutory language is drafted in a way that makes perfect harmony impossible.

The court concluded the better reading, in context, was that “negligence under this section” means negligence with respect to the requirements of section 627.748. Because the plaintiff did not allege that Lyft violated the rideshare statute itself, she did not plead “negligence under this section.”

The plaintiff’s third argument was procedural. She argued Lyft’s statutory immunity was an affirmative defense and therefore could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court rejected that as well. It found subsection 18 is not a traditional affirmative defense but a broad immunity that cuts to the core of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action against a TNC. The court focused on the statute’s emphatic language: “There is no liability.” That language, the court said, sounds like immunity; not an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead and prove later.

The court explained that subsection 18 establishes a default rule of nonliability when the operative conditions are met, and then provides exceptions. If the claim is brought under general law, by reason of the TNC’s network ownership/operation/maintenance or affiliation with the driver, for harm arising out of the use, operation, or possession of a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged on, then the plaintiff must plead facts bringing the case within one of the statutory exceptions. The plaintiff had already been given an opportunity to amend to do that and failed.

The court ended by affirming dismissal with prejudice. The plaintiff’s negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims were barred by section 627.748(18).

The practical result of this case, is that even claims framed as Lyft’s own direct wrongdoing–like allegedly misleading safety statements on its website–may still be barred if the injury occurred during a rideshare trip and the complaint does not plead a violation under section 627.748(18)(a). Footnote 16 of the opinion seems to telegraph that pleading certain factual allegations to take the matter out of the paragraphs supporting the broad immunity is the only way around it.

TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMED AFTER FINDING COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS REGARDING THE DECEDENT’S MENTAL INCAPACITY TO ENTER THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

Dolphin Pointe Health Care, LLC v. Moravia, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D960 (Fla. May 11, 2026):

The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action alleging the decedent died as a result of abuse and neglect while a resident at the defendant nursing home. The defendant moved to compel arbitration based on the admission paperwork.

The trial court heard testimony and reviewed records, including evidence that the decedent had been found wandering around in a confused state, had a hospital stay with a dementia-related diagnosis, and exhibited agitation and poor concentration around the time of admission.

Most importantly, the decedent’s son testified the decedent’s “mentation was waxing and waning,” sometimes making sense and other times referring to his deceased wife as if she were alive. The trial court found that testimony persuasive and concluded the son proved by the greater weight of the evidence that the decedent lacked the mental capacity to enter the arbitration agreement.

The appellate court affirmed, stressing that where competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings on capacity, it will not reweigh the evidence even if there is other evidence that might support a different conclusion.

TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL AFTER AN ORDER IN NON-BINDING ARBITRATION, RULE 1.820(H) REQUIRES LITIGANTS TO FILE BOTH A NOTICE OF REJECTION OF THE ARBITRATOR’S DECISION, AS WELL AS MOTION FOR TRIAL DE NOVO, OR ELSE THE AWARD STANDS

Sanchez v. People’s Trust Ins. Co., 51 Fla. L. Weekly D979 (Fla. May 13, 2026):

The plaintiff sued her insurer for homeowner’s insurance benefits arising from an alleged wind loss. The trial court referred the matter to nonbinding arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the defendant insurer owed nothing.

Two days later, the plaintiff filed a “Motion for Trial De Novo. Unfortunately, she failed to include the required notice rejecting the arbitrator’s decision, a requirement that became effective in 2024. She cited an older version of the rule instead.

The defendant moved for entry of judgment on the arbitration decision. The plaintiff attempted to cure by filing an amended motion with the correct rejection language, but did do so until after the deadline.

The appellate court affirmed the final judgment adopting the arbitration decision, holding the rule requires that both a notice of rejection and request for trial be filed in the same document within 20 days (expressly stating that no other action or inaction will be deemed a rejection).

TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING DISCLOSURE OF ALLEGED TRADE SECRETS WITHOUT DETERMININE WHETHER THE DOCUMENTS INCLUDED TRADE SECRETS, WHETHER THE NEED FOR PRODUCTION OUTWEIGHED THE INTEREST IN MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY AND WHAT PROTECTIVE MEASURES COULD BE TAKEN TO LIMIT THE HARM OF PRODUCTION—TRIAL COURT MISTAKENLY RELIED ON COURT’S DENIAL OF CERT WITHOUT AN OPINION AS PRECEDENTIAL

All Paving & Sealcoating LLC v. Daly, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D990 (Fla. May 13, 2026):

The owners of the plaintiff company sued their son and the son’s fiancée, alleging they converted a second paving company, trademarks, and other property. During discovery, the son requested QuickBooks reports identifying the five largest customers and suppliers and total sales and purchases and later sought unfiltered QuickBooks files.

The trial court compelled production of unfiltered QuickBooks records without making findings on whether the information constituted trade secrets, whether there was reasonable necessity for the materials, or what protective measures were required. The plaintiff argued that the request sought customer lists and sensitive financial information that would be devastating if disclosed to a hostile competitor.

Ultimately, after continued noncompliance, the trial court struck the plaintiff’s complaint and entered final judgment as a sanction.

The appellate court reversed. It held that when trade secret privilege is asserted, the trial court must determine whether the materials are trade secrets, require a showing of reasonable necessity, and, if disclosure is ordered, set forth findings and implement protective measures. The trial court did not do that here.

The court also corrected the trial court’s suggestion that a prior denial of certiorari “upheld” the discovery order. It admonished that a denial of a petition for writ of certiorari without an opinion is not an “affirmance” and does not establish law of the case.