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FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 51 NUMBER 17

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF MAY 1, 2026

A CLIENT MAY DISMISS A REFERRAL ATTORNEY JUST AS THE CLIENT MAY DISCHARGE THE LEAD COUNSEL—REFERRAL ATTORNEY’S FEE IS ALSO LIMITED TO QUANTUM MERUIT (CAPPED BY THE CONTRACT), AND THE TRIAL COURT MUST CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE AWARDING SUCH A FEE

Virgin v. Frexes, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D851 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 22, 2026):

This case arose out of a 2015 airplane crash that killed eight people, including the plaintiff’s husband. The widow turned to her aunt, an attorney (Ms. Frexes), who referred the matter to a firm that handles wrongful death and aviation claims. All parties signed a representation agreement compliant with Bar Rule 4-1.5(g), providing for a referral fee arrangement.

After disagreements over the referring attorney’s involvement and work (and the client’s distaste over how much money the attorney received from a partial settlement), the client emailed the referring attorney on January 28, 2019, stating she was terminating her as “co-counsel” and replacing her with someone with more knowledge in the substantive area of law. The referring attorney responded that she was not “co-counsel” but the referring attorney, and that it would “cost” the client to do that. The referring attorney notified lead counsel that she was still the referring attorney.

As an initial matter, the court held that the emails were sufficient to discharge counsel and that no magic words are required (it can be as simple as “You are fired”), although the referring attorney argued otherwise.

After several more settlements were procured, the referral attorney filed a charging lien claiming entitlement to the contractual fee.

After a four-day bench trial, the trial court awarded the contractual fee (25%) and alternatively awarded the same amount as quantum meruit, including time well after discharge.

The appellate court reversed. It held the client’s right to discharge counsel cannot be turned into an economic penalty, and a discharged referral attorney is not entitled to the contractual percentage fee; the remedy is modified quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services before discharge, capped by the maximum contract fee.

It also held the trial court’s alternative quantum meruit ruling was legally erroneous because it failed to meaningfully engage in the required analysis and failed to consider the totality of circumstances (including discharge, scope of work, and work performed pursuing the attorney’s own recovery). The case was remanded for the proper modified quantum meruit analysis.

COURT AFFIRMS ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF ON THE DEFENDANT’S WORKERS’ COMP IMMUNITY DEFENSE; DECEDENT WAS ON SITE TO PREPARE A BID AND WAS NEVER ACTUALLY HIRED AS A SUBCONTRACTOR, SO CONTRACTOR COULD NOT CLAIM STATUTORY EMPLOYER IMMUNITY ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS

Willis A. Smith Constr., Inc. v. Keathley, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D858 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 24, 2026):

The defendant contractor was restoring a structure on USF’s Sarasota campus and issued an open invitation to bid on subcontracting work for hurricane screens. The decedent, a part owner of West Shore Construction, went to the job site to prepare West Shore’s bid. While there, he fell from a fourth-floor balcony and died.

In response to the wrongful death lawsuit, the contractor asserted workers’ compensation immunity, arguing that the decedent was its statutory employee.

The plaintiff asserted that West Shore never had a “contractual relationship” with the contractor. She argued that West Shore was never hired, was never under an obligation to submit a bid, and never did submit a bid. She also argued that there was never any contractual privity, no compensation was paid, and the contractor never sublet any portion of its work to West Shore.

The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and granted partial summary judgment on the workers’ compensation immunity defense. The court noted the facts as plaintiff asserted them were undisputed. The court rejected defendant’s argument that the acceptance to bid amounted to “doing work in furtherance” of the contractor, and that it had “sublet” part of its contractual obligation to West Shore.

Because the undisputed facts did not support the conclusion that the contractor had passed on a portion of its contractual obligation to West Shore, the appellate court agreed that the trial court’s entry of partial summary judgment was correct.