Rules are rules

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 51 NUMBER 30

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF JULY 31, 2026

ATTORNEY’S WILLFUL FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PRETRIAL ORDER WARRANTED TRIAL COURT’S SANCTION

Metsch v. Palmeno, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1477 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 11, 2026):

This PCA contained an interesting concurrence worth including this week, as a reminder about the importance of complying with a trial court’s pre-trial order.

The plaintiff’s attorney appealed an order requiring him personally to reimburse the defendant $1,500 in attorney’s fees as a sanction arising from his conduct surrounding the pretrial conference. The pretrial order expressly warned that failure to comply could result in sanctions. The defendant filed a motion for sanctions alleging that plaintiff’s counsel had failed to cooperate in complying with the pretrial order, including the requirements for mediation and preparation of the pretrial stipulation, jury instructions, and verdict form.

At the pretrial conference, the plaintiff’s counsel explained that he did not believe mediation was appropriate because his client had been battered by the defendant. When the trial court asked why he had not sought relief from the mediation requirement rather than simply refusing to comply, counsel became combative, refused to respond further, and invited the court to dismiss the case so that he could appeal the dismissal.

The trial court found that counsel’s failure to comply with its order was willful, and that his conduct was contumacious and disrespectful. It also found that the resulting delay prejudiced the defendant and created case-management problems because the case was already well beyond applicable time standards. However, the court considered that counsel had not previously engaged in similar misconduct and that his client did not appear to have been involved. Rather than dismissing the plaintiff’s case, the court imposed the lesser sanction of $1,500 in attorney’s fees assessed against the attorney personally.

The Third District affirmed. Because the plaintiff’s counsel provided no transcript of the pretrial conference, he was required to demonstrate reversible error from the face of the limited record. That record showed that the attorney had notice of the requested sanctions, and had the chance (and did) to explain his noncompliance, undermining any argument of a due process violation.

Judge Logue’s concurrence emphasized the importance of enforcing pretrial orders in the era of active case management and praised the trial court for declining counsel’s invitation to dismiss the case (instead carefully considering the relevant factors and fashioning a restrained sanction directed at the attorney responsible for the misconduct). The concurrence described the order as a “model sanctions order” and cautioned appellate courts not to undermine trial courts’ ability to enforce compliance with pretrial orders.

THE COURT—NOT A JURY– SHOULD HAVE INTERPRETED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHERE NO DISPUTED EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE REQUIRED FACTFINDING—COURT CONCLUDED ON DE NOVO REVIEW THAT THE CONTRACT REQUIRED THE CITY TO PAY MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VISION INSURANCE, BUT NOT SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS

City of Lake Worth, Florida v. Viera, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1490 (Fla. 4th DCA Jul. 22, 2026):

The plaintiff was a City of Lake Worth police officer who was injured in the line of duty in 2000 and later retired on disability. Following years of litigation over the City’s obligation to provide health-insurance benefits, the plaintiff and defendant City entered into a written settlement agreement in 2018 addressing the insurance benefits the City would provide to the plaintiff and his family.

The agreement stated that the City would provide the “health insurance benefits” it provided to benefits-eligible employees and retirees and identified medical, dental, and vision insurance as the coverage then offered. It separately addressed the plaintiff’s existing life-insurance benefits, stating that those benefits would continue under their existing terms and would not be affected by the agreement.

The City paid the plaintiff’s health, prescription, dental, and vision insurance premiums but did not pay premiums for life insurance or other supplemental insurance products. The plaintiff sued for breach of the settlement agreement, contending that the City was required to provide broader benefits, including life insurance, accidental death and dismemberment coverage, employee assistance coverage, and other supplemental insurance products.

The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment concerning the meaning of the settlement agreement. The trial court denied both motions and allowed the jury to determine what benefits the agreement required.

The jury found that the City breached the agreement and awarded more than $7 million in damages, which resulted in a final judgment of approximately $9.97 million after prejudgment interest.

The appellate court reversed first because the interpretation of the agreement presented a legal question for the court rather than a factual question for the jury.

The court explained that a judge must first interpret the contract as a whole, using ordinary principles of textual interpretation, to determine whether an actual ambiguity exists and whether resolution of that ambiguity depends upon disputed extrinsic evidence.

A disagreement between the parties over the meaning of contractual language does not, standing alone, create a factual question for a jury. Only when an ambiguity requires resolution through disputed extrinsic evidence does a fact question arise for a jury’s determination.

Here, neither side relied upon disputed extrinsic evidence to establish the contract’s meaning. Instead, both parties contended that the agreement was unambiguous and asked the trial court to interpret it as a matter of law.

Reading the agreement as a whole, the Fourth District held that the City was required to provide and pay for medical, dental, and vision insurance—not every supplemental insurance product offered to City employees. The agreement specifically identified those three forms of coverage as the contemplated health-insurance benefits and separately provided that the plaintiff’s existing life insurance would continue unaffected. Because there was no dispute that the City had paid for the medical, dental, and vision benefits required by the agreement, the City had not breached the contract.

The court therefore reversed and remanded for entry of final summary judgment in favor of the defendant City.

COVID-19 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS COULD NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL WHERE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE A COVID-19-RELATED CLAIM—TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED ON PRESUIT MATERIALS THAT WERE OUTSIDE THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE COMPLAINT

Grek on behalf of Grek v. CL Golden, LLC, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1506 (Fla. 1st DCA July 22, 2026):

Following the death of the plaintiff’s decedent, the plaintiff personal representative brought claims against the defendants for negligence, medical malpractice, nursing-home negligence, violations of Florida’s Nursing Home Residents’ Bill of Rights, and wrongful death.

The complaint alleged compliance with the applicable statutory presuit screening requirements and stated that notices of intent had been served and that counsel’s investigation was supported by a qualified health care provider’s corroborating affidavit. The notices and affidavit, however, were not attached to the complaint.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by the limitations period applicable to COVID-19-related claims against health care providers under section 768.381(5), Florida Statutes. In support of their motions, the defendants relied upon materials from the presuit process.

The plaintiff responded that the complaint itself did not plead a COVID-19-related claim and that the trial court could not rely upon materials outside the complaint to determine otherwise. The trial court nevertheless considered the presuit materials, concluded that the claims were COVID-19-related, and dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice.

The appellate court dismissed. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense ordinarily raised in an answer. It may support dismissal only when the complaint and its attachments conclusively establish the defense. A trial court therefore cannot dismiss a complaint based upon an affirmative defense that requires consideration of matters outside the four corners of the complaint.

Here, nothing on the face of the complaint alleged that the decedent contracted COVID-19 or that the plaintiff’s claims were based upon or related to COVID-19. The presuit affidavit and notices were not attached to the complaint, and the complaint’s limited references to those materials for the purpose of alleging compliance with presuit requirements did not incorporate their contents as substantive factual allegations.

For the same reason, the heightened pleading and culpability requirements applicable to COVID-19-related claims could not support dismissal. Those requirements apply only when the action actually pleads a COVID-19-related claim, which the operative complaint did not.

The court vacated the final judgments and remanded for further proceedings.