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FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 51 NUMBER 1

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF JANUARY 9, 2026

THIRD DISTRICT VACATES ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND TO ADD PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHERE MOVING PARTY FAILED TO ATTACH PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT TO MOTION AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 20-DAY SERVICE REQUIREMENT

Levine v. Levai, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D33 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 31, 2025):

The Third District reversed a nonfinal order that granted leave to amend the pleadings to add punitive damages. The plaintiffs moved for leave to add punitive damages but did not attach the proposed amended complaint to their motion; the proposed amended complaint was filed later, after a motion to strike and shortly before the hearing.

The court reiterated the procedural “gatekeeping” function required by section 768.72 and held that a motion seeking to add punitive damages must comply with both rule 1.190(a) (attachment requirement) and rule 1.190(f) (service at least 20 days before the hearing). Rule 1.190(f) does not waive the requirement to attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion, and the procedural safeguards are strictly enforced.

Because the movants failed to attach the proposed amended complaint to the motion at least 20 days before the hearing, the trial court erred in granting leave to amend. The Third District vacated the order and remanded with instructions to deny the motion to amend.

In a footnote, the court noted how it had not reached the substance of the proffer, but questioned whether evidence in the form of a declaration using the phrase “to the best of my knowledge and belief,” thereby insulating the declarant from the truth of the matter asserted, could furnish “a reasonable basis” to recover punitive damages.

PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT; SIXTH DISTRICT REVERSES DENIAL OF INSURER’S ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES WHERE TRIAL COURT FOUND AN “AMBIGUITY” BY READING A SINGLE PARAGRAPH IN ISOLATION; PROPOSAL MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE; REMANDED FOR DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE FEE AMOUNT

Security First Ins. Co. v. Cincotta, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1 (Fla. 6th DCA Dec. 23, 2025):

Defendant appealed an order denying its motion for entitlement to attorneys’ fees after the trial court found its proposal for settlement  to be ambiguous, and therefore noncompliant with section 768.79 and rule 1.442.

The Sixth District reversed. It agreed the trial court failed to interpret the proposal as a whole and that, when read in context, the proposal was not ambiguous. The court pointed to the proposal’s repeated, unmistakable identification of the Defendant as the only party making the offer, paying the settlement amount, and being dismissed upon acceptance, and held the trial court erred by extracting one paragraph and treating it as an ambiguity rather than reading it alongside the surrounding provisions that limited the offer to the Defendant.

The court therefore reversed the order denying entitlement and remanded for further proceedings to determine the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be awarded.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE–“SAME SPECIALTY” EXPERT REQUIREMENT–SECOND DISTRICT REVERSES WHERE TRIAL COURT PERMITTED NEPHROLOGIST TO GIVE STANDARD-OF-CARE OPINIONS AGAINST VASCULAR SURGEON (INCLUDING THAT HE “WOULD NOT HAVE” ORDERED CERTAIN TESTS/PROCEDURES)– ERROR NOT HARMLESS AND NOT “CUMULATIVE”; NEW TRIAL

Blackshear v. Haynes, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D23 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 31, 2025):

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff alleged that a vascular surgeon both committed medical malpractice and ordered unnecessary diagnostic tests, causing kidney damage. The key issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by allowing a nephrologist to give opinion testimony that functioned as standard-of-care testimony against the vascular surgeon, despite the statutory “same specialty” requirement.

The Second District held the testimony should not have been admitted. The court explained that, in an action under chapter 766, an expert may not testify to the professional standard of care against a specialist unless the expert specializes in the same specialty as the health care provider.

Here, the nephrologist’s testimony that he would not have ordered the renal vein renin assay, angiogram, or balloon angioplasty amounted to inadmissible standard-of-care testimony (a direct comment on what a reasonably prudent provider in the surgeon’s specialty would do), even if framed as what the nephrologist would have done.

The court also rejected the harmless error argument, concluding that the improperly admitted opinions were not merely cumulative of the vascular surgery standard-of-care testimony, because the necessity of the testing and procedures was central to the disputed issues and the experts disagreed. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.