Really, we can serve by email overseas?!

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 51 NUMBER 4

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF JANUARY 30, 2026

EMAIL SERVICE ON FOREIGN DEFENDANTS UNDER SECTION 48.197 DOES NOT REQUIRE “DUE DILIGENCE” THROUGH THE HAGUE PROCESS FIRST; MALTA’S ARTICLE 10 OBJECTION DOES NOT BAR EMAIL SERVICE, AND SERVICE STANDS WHERE IT IS COURT ORDERED, REASONABLY CALCULATED TO GIVE ACTUAL NOTICE, AND NOT PROHIBITED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

Wepard Corp. Ltd. v. Diaz, Reus, & Targ, LLP, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D144 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 21, 2026):

This is a law firm fee dispute that turned into a fight over service on a foreign defendant. The law firm plaintiff, sued several defendants for failing to pay its legal fees. All of the defendants were located in Malta. Malta is a signatory to the Hague Convention.

Based on the extensive e-mail communications between the parties, the plaintiff moved to serve the complaint by e-mail, pursuant to a statute the Florida Legislature enacted in 2024, section 48.197(1)(c) which provides:

“Pursuant to motion and order by the court, by other means, including electronically by email or other technology, which the party seeking service shows is reasonably calculated to give actual notice of the proceedings and is not prohibited by international agreement as the court orders.”

Thus, the statute authorizes email service as long as:

(a) A court orders it;

(b) The service is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; and

(c) E-mail service is NOT prohibited by international agreement.

 The trial court ruled to allow email service. The defendants moved to quash, arguing that the law firm plaintiff had to exhaust Hague Convention avenues (i.e., go through Malta’s Central Authority) before any email service could be allowed. It also argued that Malta’s objection to “Article 10” barred the method of service.

The Third DCA rejected the defendant’s arguments and affirmed the order denying the motion to quash. The court held that the plain text of section 48.197(1)(c) does not impose a due diligence prerequisite the way Florida’s domestic alternative service statute does, so there is no statutory “hierarchy” requiring Hague first, and email only as a last resort.

The court also held Malta’s Article 10 objection did not bar email service because Article 10 addresses specific direct service methods like postal channels, and the Hague Convention (drafted in 1965) does not explicitly prohibit email service. Finally, the record supported actual notice (the appellants did not dispute they received it).

NOTE: This case did involve parties who routinely corresponded, and thus the plaintiff had “good” e-mail addresses for the defendant, which is a necessary prerequisite to being “reasonably calculated to give actual notice” to support acceptable e-mail service under the statute. Below, I have outlined the process for accomplishing this service:

1.  File a motion for 48.197(1)(c) service, and in the motion ask for a specific order authorizing email service (and get that order);
2. In the motion, show how what you have done is (i) reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and (ii) not prohibited by international agreement.
3. To do this, you mush show how you procured the email addresses, why they are reliable, and if there was any prior e-mail correspondence.
4. If the Hague (or another treaty) applies, the motion should state that it does not “prohibit email service.”
5. You must execute service exactly as authorized in the order and preserve proof, retaining copies of emails, delivery confirmations, responses (the Third DCA was persuaded by the D’s subsequent responses and participation in concluding they had “actual notice.”)

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE WAIVED IF NOT RAISED AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY; THIRD DCA AFFIRMS DENIAL OF MOTION TO QUASH BUT DISMISSES APPEAL ATTEMPTING TO IMPERMISSIBLY PACKAGE NONAPPEALABLE DEFAULT RECONSIDERATION ISSUES INTO A NONFINAL APPEAL

Ullrich v. Federal Mortgage Lending, LLC, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D155 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 21, 2026):

The defendant appealed a July 1, 2025 nonfinal order that denied a motion seeking two things: (1) to quash service of process, and (2) to reconsider an earlier interlocutory order denying a motion to vacate a judicial default. The Third DCA held it only had jurisdiction to review the portion denying the motion to quash service.

On the merits of service, the court affirmed because the defendant waived the improper service argument by not raising it at her first opportunity (she did not assert it in her initial motion to vacate default). The rest of the appeal (the attempt to get review of the default related reconsideration issue) was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.