Dragged feet do not a stricken pleading make

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 51 NUMBER 13

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF APRIL 3, 2026

TRIAL COURT ERRED BY STRIKING PLEADINGS AND ENTERING DEFAULT AS A DISCOVERY SANCTION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED EXPRESS FINDING OF WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS DISREGARD

All Dry USA v. Savell, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D573 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 25, 2026):

This case arises from a hurricane remediation bill, where the defendant homeowners refused to pay the plaintiff contractor, disputing the invoice after the work was done. The contractor sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

The defendants served a request for production that the plaintiff did not timely respond to. The trial court granted a motion to compel, and on the day responses were due the plaintiff filed a motion to extend the deadline. Before the court could rule on that request, the defendants moved to strike the complaint as a sanction for the untimeliness.  The trial court then struck the plaintiff’s complaint, entered default, and entered judgment for the defendants.

The appellate court reversed. It reminded litigants that striking pleadings is an extraordinary remedy under Rule 1.380(b)(2) and is one that is reserved for repeated violations or a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court’s authority. An order awarding such a sanction must include specific findings of willful refusal or deliberate noncompliance.

Here, while the trial court’s order focused on “prejudice” and case management deadlines, it did not make the necessary willfulness/contumaciousness finding.  A litigant’s slow compliance (and a request for more time) does not constitute stonewalling.  The court reversed the order striking the complaint, vacated the default judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.

DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT FEES–REFERENCES TO PAYMENT BEING MADE BY A CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR/INSURER DID NOT RENDER THE PROPOSAL AMBIGUOUS OR “IMPOSSIBLE,” AND THE WORD “CONTEMPLATED” DOES NOT CREATE UNCERTAINTY WHEN THE PROPOSAL OTHERWISE MAKES CLEAR THE OFFER AND OBLIGATION TO PAY

Town of Jupiter v. Armes, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D591 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 25, 2026):

The plaintiff sued the defendant in a personal injury case arising from an accident allegedly caused by a door on the defendant’s property.  Before trial, the defendant served a proposal for settlement for $500, offering to settle all claims in exchange for a voluntary dismissal with prejudice.  The plaintiff did not accept. The case went to trial and the jury returned a defense verdict, finding no negligence.

After final judgment, the defendant moved for fees based on the rejected proposal. The fight centered on one paragraph stating that, if accepted, it was “contemplated” that PGCS Claim Services would pay $500 “on behalf of” the defendant.  The plaintiff argued that language was ambiguous and created an impossible condition because PGCS was a nonparty and allegedly not bound to pay.  The trial court denied fees based on this ambiguity.

The Fourth reversed. Reading the proposal as a whole, the court held it was plain to see that the settlement agreement was between the defendant and the plaintiff and the $500 amount was clear.

Also, the court found that the fact that the payment would be processed through the defendant’s insurer/claims agent would not reasonably affect a plaintiff’s ability to evaluate whether to accept the offer, nor did it create an “impossible condition” (plaintiff asserted since nothing obligated the third party to pay, it was impossible to know whether she would be paid if she dismissed the suit). The court said that once accepted, the proposal becomes a binding contract enforceable against the defendant, irrespective of whether the check is cut by the insurer/administrator. It also found that the word “contemplated” did not create ambiguity where the proposal immediately followed with “shall pay” and otherwise made the offer and exchange unmistakable. The court defined ambiguity as “the condition of admitting more than one meaning” which was not the case.

 The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

NONMOVANT MUST DILIGENTLY PURSUE DISCOVERY TO SEEK A CONTINUANCE ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—THOSE WITH CLEAN HANDS CAN SEEK A CONTINUANCE UNDER RULE 1.510(d)

Zuchaer v. Peninsula Condominium Association, Inc., 51 Fla. L. Weekly D626 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 25, 2026):

The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant condominium association, writing to address the defendants’ argument that it still had outstanding discovery to do.

However, after the appellate court had previously reversed a default judgment and remanded, the defendants waited eleven months to serve discovery.  When the association responded with a motion for protective order, the defendants did not set it for hearing and did not move to compel responses.  Ten more months passed.

When the association moved for summary judgment, the defendants argued the pending discovery prevented entry of summary judgment, but they did not do what the rules require to obtain more time: they did not seek a continuance, and they did not submit the affidavit/declaration contemplated by Rule 1.510(d) showing specified reasons they could not present facts essential to oppose summary judgment.

A party cannot shield itself from summary judgment by citing outstanding discovery it failed to diligently pursue.

SECTION 57.105(1) AUTHORIZES ATTORNEY’S FEES BUT NOT COSTS

Rose v. Rose, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D639 (Fla. 6th DCA Mar. 27, 2026):

The trial court imposed sanctions against the appellant under section 57.105(1) in the form of attorney’s fees and costs. 

While the court affirmed the attorney’s fee award, it reversed the $75 in costs because the statutory text authorizes “a reasonable attorney’s fee” (including prejudgment interest) and says nothing about costs.  The court refused to add a costs component the Legislature did not include, affirming in part and reversing in part.