That just doesn’t add up, I’m afraid.

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 51 NUMBER 16

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF APRIL 24, 2026

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT NEW TRIAL OR REMITTITUR WHEN JURY AWARDED A $1,000,000 VERDICT AND DIDN’T EVEN FIND PERMANENCY FINDING-COURT REVERSES AND REMANDS FOR NEW TRIAL ON PERMANENCY AND ALL DAMAGES WHERE THE DAMAGES ISSUES WERE INTERRELATED AND THE JURY SEEMED TO HAVE COMPROMISED ITS VERDICT

Dolan v. Negron, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D795 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 15, 2026):

The case arose from a crash where the defendant pulled onto the right shoulder and then suddenly turned back onto the road, colliding with the plaintiff’s box truck. The plaintiff declined ambulance transport but went to the ER a few hours later with severe neck and back pain and spasms.

The plaintiff had experienced fairly serious injuries in two different accidents that occurred in the five years before this one. The plaintiff’s doctors testified that the surgery the plaintiff underwent resulted from this accident, but the defendant’s doctors testified there were no meaningful differences between the MRIs before and after the subject incident and that there was no objective evidence of permanent injury sustained.

A jury awarded the plaintiff $1,000,000 ($32,000 for past meds, $478,500 for future meds, $161,000 for past lost earnings and $328,500 for future earning capacity) but found the plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury.

On appeal, the court held several of the economic damages awarded were excessive and unsupported, especially the $161,000 in past lost earnings where the plaintiff offered no evidence tying all periods of unemployment/reduced hours over four years to the subject incident.

The court also reversed the substantial future damage award as excessive in light of the no-permanency finding, explaining that while permanency is not always a prerequisite to future economic damages, it is a significant factor in establishing reasonable certainty. The court found the jury’s verdict could not be reconciled with the evidence, requiring a new trial.

Because the damages issues were intertwined and the verdict looked compromised, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on permanency and all damages issues.

COURT REVERSES AND REMANDS FOR NEW TRIAL WHERE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED A RULE 1.310(b)(6) DEPOSITION ON IMPROPER GROUNDS; COURT ALSO HOLDS AN APPELLATE COURT CANNOT DO A RULE 90.403 BALANCING ANALYSIS FOR THE FIRST TIME UNDER THE TIPSY COACHMAN RULE, CERTIFYING CONFLICT

Caballero-Quinones v. Wilder, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D821 (Fla. 6th DCA Apr. 17, 2026):

The plaintiff, a USPS mail carrier, was stopped at a red light in his mail truck at a busy intersection when a Polk County Sheriff’s deputy drove through the intersection after being called for an emergency, colliding with another vehicle that hit the plaintiff.

During the testimony of the Sheriff’s office’s representative, the witness admitted that the Sheriff’s safety board had determined the crash was preventable, and that it was the deputy’s fault.

The plaintiff sought to introduce the sheriff’s office representative’s deposition testimony into evidence to illuminate the sheriff’s office investigation. The trial court excluded it based on the accident report privilege, the traffic citation privilege and 90.407 (subsequent remedial measures).

The court reversed. It found the plain language of section 316.066 creates a privilege when a person involved in the crash makes a statement to law enforcement for the purpose of creating a crash report.

The traffic citation privilege, section 316.650(9) bars evidence of traffic citations but not the investigation surrounding it. 90.407 makes evidence of subsequent remedial measures inadmissible, NOT the evidence of investigations conducted to determine whether to take subsequent remedial measures.

Finally, the trial court did not conduct a 90.403 analysis in refusing to admit the evidence. However, on appeal the defendant urged the appellate court to affirm based on the tipsy coachman doctrine. Because the trial court never performed the requisite 90.403 balancing analysis, it could not be conducted for the first time on appeal.

The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding error in the exclusion of this evidence (but stated that if raised below, the trial court on remand could conduct the analysis.

THIRD DISTRICT AFFIRMS ORDER VACATING DEFAULT FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 1.540(b)(1) WHERE FAILURE TO RESPOND RESULTED FROM CLERICAL/CALENDARING ERRORS AND IN-HOUSE COUNSEL’S EMERGENCY EARLY DELIVERY AND MATERNITY LEAVE; COURT EMPHASIZES RULE 1.540(b)(1) IS LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO ALLOW DECISIONS ON THE MERITS

Amerant Bank N.A. v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 51 Fla. L. Weekly D836 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 20, 2026):

Amerant served an amended complaint; D.R. Horton failed to respond, resulting in a clerk’s default and a default final judgment.

D.R. Horton moved for relief under Rule 1.540(b)(1), filing a verified motion explaining the failure to respond was caused by clerical and calendaring errors, combined with in-house counsel’s emergency hospitalization to give birth and her subsequent maternity leave.

The trial court granted relief.

On appeal, the court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding excusable neglect. It noted that 1.540(b)(1) covers “honest mistakes” and admonished that the rule should be liberally construed in favor of decisions on the merits.