The Week In Torts – Cases from June 20 2025

Another slap in the face of the Impact Rule
FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY
VOLUME 50, NUMBER 24
CASES FROM THE WEEK OF JUNE 20, 2025
COURT REVERSES CASE BROUGHT FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, CONCLUDING THAT THE IMPACT RULE DID NOT APPLY TO THE CASE
Murphy v. Heritage II Holdings, LLC, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D1300 (Fla. 5th DCA June 13, 2025):
A woman, the decedent, lived in a rental property that was owned and managed by the defendants. Soon after moving from the property, she suffered cardiac arrest.
She later filed negligence claims against the defendant alleging that it had failed to lawfully maintain the property. The decedent had claimed that the hazardous living conditions she experienced caused bodily injury, medical expenses, pain and suffering, mental anguish and physical impairment. Sadly, she passed away while her case was pending.
The defendant landlord moved for summary judgment, alleging that none of the maintenance issues or dangerous conditions raised in the complaint had “physically impacted” the decedent, and therefore the case was about non-compensable emotional distress because the impact rule barred the claims.
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that the facts were largely not in dispute and that the rental property had continually experienced plumbing problems and electrical fluctuations and outages.
The plumbing problems resulted in raw sewage frequently backing up into the decedent’s bathtub and toilet and sand in the running water. She and her family were often unable to use the toilets or shower in their home.
The electrical problems stemming from improper wiring caused arcing behind the walls and the electrical panel box resulted in electrical outages and periodic smoke. One power outage caused the decedent’s insulin medication to go bad due to lack of refrigeration and the defendant had received citations for multiple code violations related to these conditions.
The decedent had a preexisting heart condition and later suffered cardiac arrest. The plaintiff presented evidence showing that the prolonged exposure to the unsafe and unsanitary conditions in the residence caused significant mental anguish and emotional distress, which in turn exacerbated her preexisting heart condition and contributed substantially to producing cardiac arrest.
Importantly, according to the appellate court, the trial judge found there was no doubt that the decedent had inhaled microscopic particles into her body from the smell of raw sewage and smoke from the wires, further acknowledging that Florida courts have found ingesting and inhaling chemicals or substances, even microscopic in nature, can in fact constitute an impact.
Because there was clearly an impact involved in this case, Willis v. Gami Golden Glades prohibited the impact rule from applying even without evidence of an impact or touching.
AMENDMENT TO RULE 1.280
In Re Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(f), 50 Fla. L. Weekly S136 (Fla. June 19, 2025):
The Florida Supreme Court has amended Rule 1.280(f) to state that discovery may be served on the other party once the first party’s initial disclosures have been served.
The original rule stated that a party’s initial disclosure obligations had to be “satisfied” before discovery could be served and has resulted in adverse parties refusing to participate in discovery claiming that the opposite party’s initial disclosures were insufficient or inadequate.
To ensure that discovery is not stymied by obstructive litigants, the Court ruled that the party may conduct discovery once initial disclosures are served.
COURT REVERSES ANOTHER TRIAL JUDGE WHO ALLOWED AN AMENDMENT FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Duff v. Racine, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D1270 (Fla. 4th DCA June 11, 2025):
The decedent drowned while scuba diving on a chartered tour. The decedent had become separated from the group at some point during the dive and was later found unresponsive on the ocean floor.
One of the three defendants testified that before the dive he had identified the decedent as a person who might need some extra help and noted that she had not been diving in about 4 months. He also noticed that she seemed a little “off” during the pre-dive instructions, but believed it was just her personality. He had no reason to believe that she was intoxicated, but she was.
For the proffer for punitive damages, the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s statement to the police supporting allegations of gross negligence warranting punitive damages.
The plaintiff also submitted an affidavit from a senior maritime consultant who reviewed the evidence and was familiar with the relevant standards of care, and opined that allowing an intoxicated person to dive along with allowing a diver who had been identified as requiring special assistance to get out of the leader’s eyesight for 4 to 10 minutes, and not using the industry standard buddy system was all gross negligence that constituted punitive damages.
In reversing, the court found that the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard, having applied the general liberal pleading standard rather than the heightened standard required by Section 768.72.
The court also found that as to the two individual defendants, the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages for failing to show conduct that was so reckless or wanting in care, that it constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to its conduct.
As to the company defendant, the court held it could not be held liable because the plaintiff alleged general agency vicarious liability, rather than the heightened standard required for vicarious liability under Section 768.72.
The court reversed, explaining that while the allegations and evidence supported a breach of the standard of care, they did not amount to punitive conduct.
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO ADD CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE MONSANTO COMPANY FOR ITS ROUNDUP PRODUCT
Monsanto Co. v. Behar, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D1290 (Fla. 3rd DCA June 11, 2025):
The plaintiff was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and attributed his diagnosis to his use of Roundup.
He moved for leave to amend his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages, asserting that Monsanto engaged in a systematic effort to discredit the unfavorable science, and created “new science” through ghostwriting, also having manipulated federal agencies through the use of disinformation (plaintiff cited to several studies and information to support those claims). The plaintiff also asserted that the prior punitive damage awards against Roundup supported his claim for them.
Monsanto refuted the allegations, introducing strong evidence that it had nothing to do with these independent labs’ actions, and asserted that it was a victim of fraud.
The court concluded – yet again – that the allegations, proffer and record evidence did not demonstrate intentional misconduct or gross negligence. It noted that while Monsanto was well aware of the continued reevaluation of the chemical glyphosate since 1973, the record did not show that glyphosate is a carcinogenic or that Monsanto knew it was, and that it then intentionally sold the product without a warning label anyway.
Monsanto reasonably relied on decades of scientific evidence and found that “unsupported salacious allegations, a scientific outlier and isolated internal correspondence by mid-level employees that were quoted out of context” could not meet the statutory requirements for punitive damages.
The court admonished that punitive damages are reserved for truly culpable and egregious behavior, and that the allegations and evidence in this case fell short of that, once again requiring reversal.