An empty agreement…

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 50, NUMBER 13

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF APRIL 4, 2025

APPELLATE COURT INVALIDATES COBLENTZ AGREEMENT — AFFIRMS TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF NO COVERAGE AND NO DUTY TO DEFEND OR INDEMNIFY

Freedom Office’s Corp. v. Rockhill Insurance Co., 50 Fla. L. Weekly D702 (Fla. 3rd DCA Mar. 26, 2025):

The case arose from a Coblentz Agreement—a negotiated consent judgment between the injured party and the defendant, reached after the defendant’s insurance company denied coverage and declined to defend the lawsuit.

To recover under the agreement, the injured party must do three things: (a) sue the insurer; (b) prove coverage along with a wrongful refusal to defend; and (c) demonstrate that the settlement was reasonable and made in good faith.

Here, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. The trial court correctly found that there was no coverage, nor was there a duty to defend under the terms of the policy in light of the exclusions. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge’s refusal to enforce the Coblentz Agreement.

NO ERROR IN DISMISSING NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING CLAIM BASED ON AN INSUFFICIENT CORROBORATING AFFIDAVIT—HOWEVER, TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN DISMISSING CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN THE STATE AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY

Tomas v. Sandler, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D706 (Fla. 3rd DCA Mar. 26, 2025):

The plain language of the pre-suit statute requires corroboration of all medical negligence claims by a qualified expert. Negligent credentialing is a distinct tort that involves wrongful conduct both by the person or entity who is derivatively liable, and the actor whose wrongful conduct was the direct cause of the injury to another.

The plaintiff’s expert stated in his affidavit that the hospital negligently credentialed the physician to perform a total ankle replacement. However, the affidavit was devoid of detail as to the administrative standard of care related to credentialing or any supporting facts. Thus, the hospital was left with no information to evaluate the merits of the negligent credentialing claim, requiring dismissal.

However, the trial court wrongfully dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims based on its ruling that the plaintiff failed to join the State as an indispensable party.

An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the controversy of such a nature, that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting the interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.

The defendant’s medical providers contended that the State was an indispensable party because they had treated the plaintiff in their capacity as agents of the state.

Although the defendants and the trial court couched the argument and ruling in terms of failing to join an indispensable party, the appellate court found what was really at issue was an indirect assertion of sovereign immunity.

There would have to be a determination that sovereign immunity applied before the trial court could consider whether the State was an indispensable party.

Yet, the determination of whether the providers were negligent in treating the plaintiff was not dependent upon the addition of the State as a party, and since that issue had not been litigated, the State could not even be considered indispensable for that reason.

Another issue that factored in the ruling was the parties’ agreement that the statute of limitations barred any potential cause of action against the State or its agencies.

Courts have consistently ruled that they should not dismiss an action based on a plaintiff’s failure to join an indispensable party, if dismissal would foreclose the claim of the present plaintiff.

For all these reasons, the court affirmed the portion of the order dismissing the negligent credentialing claim against the hospital, but reversed the dismissal to the extent that the remaining claims should not have been dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party.