You can’t have them all!

FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY

VOLUME 50, NUMBER 14

CASES FROM THE WEEK OF APRIL 11, 2025

TRIAL COURT DEPARTED FROM ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF LAW BY ORDERING PRODUCTION OF ALL MEDICAL RECORDS WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN IN-CAMERA REVIEW

Rodriguez v. Currey, 50 Fla. L. Weekly 787 (Fla. 5^th DCA Apr. 3, 2025):

In this car accident case, the defendant sought the plaintiff’s medical records from twenty different health care providers, pharmacies, insurers, and employers. The plaintiff objected on multiple grounds, one being that the defendant’s subpoenas were overbroad because they sought all of the plaintiff’s medical records instead of just those relevant to the lawsuit. The plaintiff asked the trial court to narrow the subpoenas by time frame and subject matter, or alternatively to inspect the records in camera to decide which of them were relevant.

Over the plaintiff’s objections, the trial court ordered her to produce all the records from the five years before the accident.

The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, maintaining that the court had to at least limit the subpoenas to records concerning the body parts that she allegedly injured in the accident. Alternatively, the plaintiff again requested an in-camera inspection. The trial court also denied reconsideration.

In seeking certiorari (irreparable harm + departure from the essential requirements of law=granting of writ), the court noted that irreparable harm analysis in a case like this one is straightforward. Medical records are protected by the right to privacy in the Florida Constitution, and litigants only waive their right to privacy as to those records when they are relevant to a pending lawsuit. Thus, when a court compels the production of irrelevant medical records, the impacted litigant suffers irreparable harm.

As to whether the court departed from the essential requirements of law, the court first noted that information sought in discovery must be relevant to the issues to be litigated as framed by the pleadings.

Here, both parties asserted that the pleadings supported their respective positions. The defendant insisted that all of the subpoenaed documents were relevant, while the plaintiff argued that the requests would necessarily disclose irrelevant records. As an alternative to quashing the subpoenas, the plaintiff asked for an in-camera review.

The appellate court agreed that the relevancy issue could not be answered without reviewing the actual records.

Because the plaintiff did assert her right to privacy in her medical records, the trial court should have inspected the records to ensure that the defendant only received those documents relevant to the lawsuit. By ordering the production of all records for the five years before the accident without holding an in-camera review, the court departed from the essential requirements of law.

On remand, the court ordered that the trial court must inspect the plaintiff’s medical records in camera to prevent disclosure of information not relevant to the litigation and should conduct an in-camera inspection to segregate any private documents that were not relevant to the case.

APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMS DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S PERSONAL INJURY CASE FOR FRAUD ON THE COURT—PLAINTIFFS “SENTIENTLY ENGINEERED” A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD DEFENDANT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS—APPELLATE COURT SUA SPONTE IMPOSED § 57.105 SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS WHO FILED MERITLESS BRIEFS CONTAINING NO ANALYSIS OR ARGUMENT

Galusha v. Lowe’s Home Centers, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D789 (Fla. 5th DCA Apr. 4, 2025):

Morgan and Morgan withdrew from representing these pro se plaintiffs, whose lying caused the trial court to dismiss their personal injury case against Lowe’s for fraud on the court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that the injured plaintiff and his unlicensed lawyer wife lied about matters that permeated the entire case and went to the very core of the case.

The plaintiff had given three different dates on which the single injury-causing event—a claimed avalanche of garbage can lids—had allegedly occurred. According to Lowe’s proof and the trial court’s findings, the event never occurred.

Through fabrication, false testimony, and concealment, the appellate court agreed with the trial judge that the plaintiff sentiently also engineered and engaged in an unconscionable scheme to defraud the defendant and the judicial process, by denying prior and subsequent relevant events, injuries and treatment.

The court found that the evidence presented and relied on by the trial court was clear, convincing, and overwhelming, and that the trial court’s findings were all based on competent substantial evidence. The plaintiff also failed to come forward with any contrary proof or reasonable explanation for the “missteps”, despite having an ample opportunity to do so.

The appellate court actually reprinted the entire 11-page order in a helpful decision for those wishing to draft a dismissal for fraud on the court.

The appellate court also sua sponte imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs pursuant to Section 57.105, as they knew or should have known that their attempt to reverse the lower court on appeal was not supported by the material facts or applicable law.

Adding fuel to the proverbial fire, the court pointed out how the appellant even described himself and his co-plaintiff wife as being “well-schooled in the law” and “hardly unschooled pro se litigants.”

The court observed that the case was “the epitome of a frivolous, meritless appeal,” which the defendant was obligated to participate and advocate, further necessitating the sanctions.

DEFENDANT SUBSTANCE ABUSE FACILITY OWED A DUTY TO THE DECEDENT FOR THE MANNER OF THE DECEDENT’S DISCHARGE, EVEN THOUGH THE DECEDENT OVERDOSED 48 DAYS AFTER DISCHARGE WHEN HE WAS NO LONGER IN THE CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE FACILITY

Burley v. The Village South, Inc., 50 Fla. L. Weekly D753 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 2, 2025):

The decedent had been involuntarily committed to the defendant facility, and addiction treatment center. The plaintiff alleged that the facility owed a legal duty pursuant to statute and the facility’s own policies and procedures to refer the decedent to an appropriate inpatient treatment center and to arrange for post-discharge management of his medication to treat his opioid addiction.

The facility successfully moved for summary judgment, asserting it owed no duty to someone who overdosed 48 days after discharge, since the decedent was not in the custody and control of the defendant.

The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff that it was not the “act” of discharge, but rather the “manner” of discharge that triggered the duty. The court found that there was a source of duty both from the legislative enactments/administrative regulations applicable to a service provider of substance abuse services, as well as one stemming from the general facts (even though there is generally no duty owed to someone outside of an entity’s custody and control as was the case here, it was the facility’s actions before the decedent left that gave rise to the duty), and because there were genuine disputed issues of material fact, the trial court improperly entered summary judgment.